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Should the "Substantial Overbreadth"
Doctrine Be Overhauled? The Example of
Morrisette v. Dilworth
INTRODUCTION
D URING the 1960's the overbreadth doctrine1 emerged as
perhaps the most effective judicial safeguard against legisla-
tive infringements upon first amendment interests. By the end of
the decade, courts summarily struck down laws which they consid-
ered to be unconstitutionally "overbroad." Such laws not only
proscribed activity which is of legitimate governmental concern,
but also were capable of "impermissible" applications to instances
of speech and association 2 which, in the opinion of the reviewing
courts,3 were entitled to first amendment protection.
The rise of the overbreadth doctrine was not, however, unac-
companied by criticism,4 and this criticism proved quite influential
1. The doctrine has received considerable attention in the literature. See Bogen, First
Amendment Ancillary Doctrines, 37 MD. L. REv. 679, 705-14 (1978); Monaghan, Overbreadth,
1981 Sup. CT. REV. 1; Shaman, The First Amendment Rule Against Overbreadth, 52 TxEp. L.Q.
259 (1979); Torke, The Future of First Amendment Overbreadth, 27 VAND. L. REv. 289 (1974);
Note, Overbreadth Review and the Burger Court, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 532 (1974) [hereinafter
N.Y.U. Note]; Note, Narrowing the Overbreadth Doctrine?, 45 CoLo. L. REv. 361 (1974) [here-
inafter Colorado Note]; Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REv.
844 (1970) [hereinafter Harvard Note]; Annot., 45 L. Ed. 2d 725 (1976) [hereinafter
Overbreadth Annotation].
2. The doctrine arguably could be applied to any freedom guaranteed in the Bill of
Rights. See Overbreadth Annotation, supra note 1, at 738-40. However, application of the
doctrine to laws that affect activity other than speech (including all forms of expression)
and association are relatively rare, and past analyses suggest that the doctrine is limited to
these core first amendment activities. See generally Monaghan, supra note 1; Shaman, supra
note 1; Harvard Note, supra note 1. "Association" is, of course, nowhere mentioned in the
first amendment. Gradually, however, jurists came to recognize that the right of association
was a necessary concomitant of the rights which are enumerated in the first amendment.
See generally Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1
(1964); Annot., 33 L. Ed. 2d 865 (1973); and Justice William 0. Douglas's Meiklejohn
Lecture (Brown University, May 6, 1963), reprinted at 63 COLIJM. L. Rav. 1361 (1963).
3. For the purposes of this Comment, no position need be taken as to whether any
particular type of speech or association should be considered absolute-that is, entitled to
judicial protection in all instances, regardless of the opinions of the reviewing courts.
4. See infra note 48 and accompanying text.
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with the Burger Court. Shortly after the transition of justices at
the beginning of the 1970's, the Court undertook a "re-examina-
tion"5 of the doctrine. This reexamination resulted in the Court's
declaration that seemingly overbroad laws should henceforth be
invalidated only when their overbreadth is "substantial. "6 Though
commentators accurately predicted that this revision of the doc-
trine would represent a deliberate toning down of overbreadth
scrutiny, there currently is no consensus as to the state of the doc-
trine.7 Ten years after its inception, the "substantial overbreadth"
standard itself is ripe for reexamination.
Morrisette v. Dilworth" illustrates that the substantial over-
breadth standard has deprived overbreadth analysis of much of its
promise for protecting first amendment interests other than
"pure speech." Morrisette involved a police officer's challenge to a
departmental regulation forbidding members of the force to asso-
ciate or fraternize with any person who had ever been convicted
of a misdemeanor or felony." Officer Morrisette had been disci-
plined for continuing to associate with an individual known as
"Jukebox Tony" after an internal affairs sergeant informed Mor-
risette that his friend had a felony conviction. 10 Morrisette
5. The call for a "re-examination" of the overbreadth doctrine was first made by Jus-
tice Blackmun, dissenting in Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 537 (1972).
6. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973) (discussed infra notes 52-74 and
accompanying text).
7. Compare Monaghan, supra note 1, at 3, 36-39 (endeavoring to show that the proce-
dural implications of overbreadth analysis for standing are not unconventional), with Sha-
man, supra note 1, at 260-61, 281-82 (suggesting that overbreadth analysis is an excep-
tional doctrine, and one that is essential to the appropriate, primordial protection of
speech), and Bogen, supra note 1, at 705, 714 (asserting that overbreadth is exceptional,
but noting that it likely will be applied less frequently in the future due to the ambiguous
requirement that the number of impermissible applications be "substantial").
8. 59 N.Y.2d 449, 452 N.E.2d 1222, 465 N.Y.S.2d 894 (1983), aff"g 89 A.D.2d 99,
454 N.Y.S.2d 864 (2d Dept. 1982).
9. Specifically, Suffolk County Police Dep't Rules and Procedures, ch. 2, § 5.6
provides:
No member of the Force is to associate or fraternize with persons known to
have been convicted of any misdemeanor or felony under the laws of this state
or any similar conviction under the laws of any other state or under the Federal
Law. A conviction under this rule shall not mean a conviction for any offense
under the Vehicle and Traffic Law or a violation of an ordinance of a political
subdivision of this state.
59 N.Y.2d at 451 n.1, 452 N.E.2d at 1223 n.1, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 895 n.l.
10. The conviction was for second-degree grand larceny and had occurred 17 years
prior to the disciplining of Morrisette when Jukebox Tony was 22 years old. Morrisette, 89
A.D.2d at 101, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 865. In affirming the Second Department's opinion, the
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learned that the conviction had occurred nearly twenty years ear-
lier and that the felon subsequently had received a "certificate of
relief from disabilities.""1 He reflected on the matter and con-
cluded that he would not be disciplined for continuing his associa-
tion. His conclusion proved erroneous, and after an administrative
hearing he was fined ten accrued vacation days.
Morrisette challenged the regulation as an overbroad restric-
tion on police officers' associational freedoms.12 Judge Jasen of the
New York Court of Appeals, for a unanimous court, wrote that
since the regulation addressed a broad governmental concern with
assuring the integrity of law enforcement, its incidental infringe-
ment upon associational interests did not render it impermissibly
overbroad. 13 He explained:
It is, of course, entirely possible and perhaps preferable that such a regula-
tion be written in such a manner so as to allow some associations, such as
those with relatives, despite a criminal conviction. In deciding whether a
statute is unconstitutional on its face, however, the Supreme Court has also
stated that where conduct as well as speech, or, in this case, the analogous
right of association, is involved, "the overbreadth of a statute must not only
be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly le-
gitimate sweep."'
14
No court in any other jurisdiction has upheld an "anti-associa-
tion" regulation similar to the one construed in Morrisette.1 5 The
significance of the case, however, is not merely the fact that the
Court of Appeals did not find it necessary to mention the nature of the felony.
11. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 701 (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984), which essentially is the
same as the provision that was in effect at the time in question, provides that a "certificate
of relief from disabilities" may be granted to relieve eligible offenders of any or all forfei-
tures or disabilities which were imposed automatically by reason of their convictions. As
both appellate levels of the New York courts pointed out in Morrisette, the granting of such
a certificate is "not a pardon," 89 A.D.2d at 101, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 866, and "does not
eradicate or expunge the underlying conviction," 59 N.Y.2d at 451 n.2, 452 N.E.2d at
1223 n.2, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 895 n.2.
12. Morrisette initially challenged the regulation both "as applied" to his conduct and
"on its face," but by the time the case reached the Court of Appeals the "as applied"
challenge had been dropped. The difference between "as applied" and "facial" challenges
is discussed infra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
13. Morrisette, 59 N.Y.2d at 453, 452 N.E.2d at 1224, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 896.
14. Id. at 452-53, 452 N.E.2d at 1224, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 896 (quoting Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973)).
15. Two courts, in fact, have declared such regulations invalid. DeGrazio v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 31 Ill. 2d 482, 202 N.E.2d 522 (1964) (discussed infra notes 141-43 and accomp-
anying text); Sponick v. Detroit Police Dep't, 49 Mich. App. 162, 211 N.W.2d 674 (1973)
(discussed infra notes 144-50 and accompanying text).
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Court of Appeals refused to interfere with the operation of New
York police departments.16 Rather, the case is remarkable because
it illustrates the difficulty today of persuading a court that the
overbreadth of a law affecting protected first amendment "con-
duct" or "association ' 17 is "substantial."
16. An informal survey conducted by the author in October 1983 suggests that about
two-thirds of the sheriff's departments in New York State had "anti-association" regula-
tions similar to the Suffolk County regulation at the time the Court of Appeals decided
Morrisette. All 62 of the state's sheriff's departments were contacted; 12 of the 18 respond-
ing departments reported that they had similar regulations (not including the one upheld
in Morrisette). Three of these regulations (those of Monroe, Seneca, and Wayne counties)
forbade associations not with known criminals but rather with persons of bad character. All
but two of the responding counties had regulations forbidding "conduct unbecoming an
officer" or "conduct tending to bring discredit upon the department." Obviously, associa-
tions with notorious criminals are encompassed within such alternative regulations, and
arguably, therefore, anti-association regulations are redundant. There has been much liti-
gation as to the constitutionality of police regulations proscribing "conduct unbecoming an
officer." The cases usually involve vagueness challenges, and have reached disparate re-
sults. See, e.g., Fabio v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 489 Pa. 309, 414 A.2d 82 (1980); Annot., 9
A.L.R.4th 614 (1981) (regulation not void for vagueness either on its face or as applied to
extramarital sexual conduct of officer); Bence v. Breier, 501 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1974)
(regulation unconstitutionally vague on its face and as applied to officers not using depart-
mental channels in airing grievances; several cases pro and contra validity of regulations
forbidding conduct unbecoming an officer reviewed).
In the two cases from jurisdictions other than New York in which anti-association regu-
lations have been construed, the police officers also challenged regulations proscribing con-
duct unbecoming an officer. Both courts reached a different result than the Court of Ap-
peals in Morrisette. In DeGrazio v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 31 Ill. 2d 482, 202 N.E.2d 522
(1964) (discussed infra notes 141-43 and accompanying text), the court held invalid the
officer's dismissal pursuant to such a regulation. Id. at 482, 202 N.E.2d at 525-27. In Spo-
nick v. Detroit Police Dep't, 49 Mich. App. 162, 211 N.W.2d 674 (1973) (discussed infra
notes 144-50 and accompanying text), the court held that such a regulation provided a
"standard or guide so impalpable as to be no standard at all." Id. at 175, 211 N.W.2d at
680 (quoting Hamtramck Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Pitlock, 44 Mich. App. 410, 413-14, 205
N.W.2d 293, 294-95 (1973)).
17. Neither the Second Department nor the Court of Appeals suggested that since the
"association" infringed upon by the Suffolk County Police Department regulation did not
have a predominantly political focus it was not entitled to full first amendment protection.
The position that only associations that are predominantly political are entitled to first
amendment protection is not without scholarly support. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CON-
sTrrTONAL LAW § 12-23 (1978). "Personal" and "intimate" associations, it has been ar-
gued, implicate not the first amendment but rather are located within a "generalized zone
of privacy" implicit throughout the Bill of Rights. See generally Karst, The Freedom of Inti-
mate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980). But see Emerson, supra note 2, at 20-21, where
the suggestion is made that the issue of "personal associations" can be divided into two
groups: instances where government prohibits personal associations and instances where
government compels associations. Emerson states that whereas the latter category implicates
the "right of privacy," the former category-which, he asserts, includes situations in which
a governmental body enacts "laws forbidding associations with criminals"-implicates an
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This Comment will review the history of overbreadth analysis
as a means of protecting first amendment interests, particularly
activity other than "pure speech." Overbreadth analysis as it is
presently employed will be contrasted both with "old style" over-
breadth and with other devices of constitutional adjudication.
Next, an alternative standard for overbreadth adjudication will be
proposed. This new standard will then be applied to Officer Mor-
risette's case in an attempt to illustrate how the revised standard
would be both more effective in safeguarding first amendment in-
terests and more' faithful to the constitutional tenets which
spawned the development of the overbreadth doctrine.
I. HISTORICAL AND DOCTRINAL FOUNDATIONS
OF OVERBREADTH ANALYSIS
Overbreadth analysis is, essentially, a child of the 1960's.
Though many earlier invalidations of "overbroad" laws may be
cited,"' it was the activism of the Warren Court that elevated what
absolute right to associate, if anything. Id. at 20.
Cases in which freedom of association claims have been rejected on the ground that the
associations involved were "personal" and not political have not involved per se bans on
associations but rather individual infringements on particular relationships. Baron v.
Meloni, 556 F. Supp. 796 (W.D.N.Y. 1983), is a particularly pertinent example. Petitioner
was a deputy sheriff who was observed in the presence of a reputed mobster under surveil-
lance. He was ordered not to associate with the mobster's wife (whom he had been seen
with and, indeed, subsequently married). He was again observed with her on a number of
occasions, again instructed to stay away from her, and ultimately was charged with insubor-
dination, conduct discrediting the department, and "consorting with persons of ill-repute."
Id. at 798. The hearing officer ruled that Baron had violated the insubordination regula-
tion, and he was dismissed. Id. Affirming the dismissal, the federal district court wrote that
it had "not found any authority extending the First Amendment freedom of association to
extra-marital affairs or social relationships," id. at 799, and that the implementing orders
were not vague or overbroad. Id. See also Angola v. Civiletti, 666 F.2d 1, 3 (2d Cir. 1981)
(reversing dismissal of a complaint seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against govern-
ment officials who harassed petitioner in an effort to gain information about petitioner's
friend, a convicted felon; court explicitly avoided the issue of whether social relationships
are protected under freedom of association).
18. Professor Monaghan identifies Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), as the
"fountainhead of the overbreadth doctrine." Monaghan, supra note 1, at 11. In Thornhill,
the Court invalidated a state statute forbidding any one who did not have "a just cause" to
"go near or loiter about" any business for the purpose of "hindering, delaying, or interfer-
ing with or injuring" the business. Noting that the courts below had not subjected the
statute to narrowing interpretations, 310 U.S. at 96, the Court wrote that "[wlhere regula-
tions of the liberty of free discussion are concerned, there are special reasons for observing
the rule that it is the statute, and not the accusation or the evidence under it, which
prescribes the limits of permissible conduct and warns against transgression." Id. at 98.
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was at most a judicial uneasiness to a fundamental principle of
constitutional adjudication.19 The doctrine might be summarized
as an attempt by courts to assure that government imposes no
greater restriction on citizens' fundamental liberties than is abso-
lutely necessary to prevent evils which the state may legitimately
address.20 Overbreadth analysis thus represents a judicial require-
ment that governmental objectives be pursued through the least
restrictive means when the pursuit infringes upon first amend-
ment interests.21 Unlike conventional methods of constitutional
The Court therefore declared that the law was invalid as to all, not just appellant's, activity.
In Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (discussed infra notes 24-28, 31-32 and ac-
companying text), Justice Stewart cited the following "precedents" to the overbreadth ap-
proach: Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960) (ordinance prohibiting distribution of
handbills without required names and addresses invalid because the interest in identifying
those responsible for fraud, false advertising, and libel could be served without restricting
all unnamed and unaddressed handbills); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349
(1951) (ordinance forbidding sale of milk as "pasteurized" unless bottled at an approved
plant within five miles of the center of city was invalid since reasonable nondiscriminatory
alternatives sufficient to serve legitimate local interests were available); Kunz v. New York,
340 U.S. 290 (1951) (ordinance vesting de facto authority in police commissioner to deny a
permit to speak for religious purposes invalid); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948)
(ordinance vesting unlimited discretion in the chief of police to permit use of sound ampli-
fication devices invalid because it was not narrowly drawn to regulate hours of use or vol-
ume of sound); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (ordinance forbidding
door-to-door distribution of handbills invalid since, though properly aimed at protecting
householders from annoyance, it extended too far by prohibiting all callers, thus impermis-
sibly restricting the rights of those desiring to receive and distribute certain literature);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (conviction of common law offense of incit-
ing breach of the peace invalid when there was no showing that the public speaker
presented clear and present danger of riot, disorder, traffic interference, or other immedi-
ate threat to public safety); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (cities' bans on
distribution of leaflets invalid because principal aim of preventing littering of streets can be
achieved without restricting freedom of speech and press); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303
U.S. 444 (1938) (ordinance prohibiting distribution of all literature without obtaining per-
mission of the city manager invalid because it was not restricted to obscene or offensive
literature nor to literature distributed in disorderly time, place, or manner).
19. Professor Monaghan, who contends that the implications of overbreadth analysis
are not exceptional, agrees at least that overbreadth adjudication "flower[ed]" in the
1960's. Monaghan, supra note I, at 10.
20. The word "absolutely" is carefully chosen. Advocates of "old style" overbreadth
would argue that laws should be drafted as narrowly as absolutely possible. From the earliest
stages of the doctrine's development, however, there were those who believed the better
standard would be that laws infringing fundamental liberties must be as narrow as reasona-
bly possible. See, e.g., discussion accompanying notes 31-32. See also Wormuth & Mirkin, The
Doctrine of the Least Reasonable Alternative, 9 UTAH L. REV. 254 (1964).
21. Though the "less drastic means" doctrine has been distinguished from the over-
breadth doctrine, see Harvard Note, supra note 1, at 918, at least one commentator has
asserted that a concern with least drastic means and a concern with overbreadth are identi-
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adjudication, overbreadth analysis in its original form did not in-
volve a "balancing" of governmental and individual interests.22 If
a court were satisfied that a law was overextensive in its proscrip-
tion of first amendment activity, the law would be struck down as
overbroad, no matter how compelling the need for that law. The
Constitution, it was said, mandates the path least destructive of
fundamental rights,23 if those rights must be trampled at all.
Two cases exemplify the spirit and effectiveness of "old style"
overbreadth, both of them involving freedom of association.
Shelton v. Tucker,24 decided in 1960, represents the first explicit
articulation by a majority2 5 of the Supreme Court of the doc-
trine's underlying principles. Petitioner was an Arkansas school
teacher with twenty-five years' experience who was discharged for
refusing to comply with a state statutory requirement that he list
every organization to which he had belonged or regularly contrib-
uted within the past five years. The Court acknowledged that
states have a "legitimate and substantial" interest in investigating
the competence of those whom they employ as teachers.2" The
Arkansas statute, nevertheless, was adjudged to be invalid, be-
cause that interest "cannot be pursued by means that broadly sti-
fle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more nar-
rowly achieved. ' 27 While the issue before the court was not
whether Arkansas could inquire into certain of its teachers' associ-
ational ties, it was clear that the state could not require its teach-
cal. Monaghan, supra note 1, at 38 & n.157.
22. See G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 1188 (10th ed.
1980). Courts adopting the strict overbreadth approach, in fact, often explicitly disavow
the balancing alternative. See, e.g., ChiefJustice Warren's dissent in United States v. Robel,
389 U.S. 258, 268 n.20 (1967) (discussed infra notes 29-30 and accompanying text).
23. See, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (discussed infra notes 24-28, 31-
32 and accompanying text).
24. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
25. Two examples of earlier unequivocal indications of dissatisfaction with overbroad
laws were the dissents of Justices Black and Douglas in United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell,
330 U.S. 75 (1947). Black, objecting to the majority's validation of a prohibition on politi-
cal participation by federal workers, asserted that the interest in assuring "clean politics"
did not make it "imperative to muzzle millions of citizens because some of them, if left
their constitutional freedom, might corrupt the political process." Id. at 112-13. Douglas,
in a separate dissent, asserted that the interest in preventing coercion of government work-
ers by their superiors could be achieved by limiting the prohibition to workers employed in
an administrative capacity. Id. at 124-26.
26. See Shelton, 364 U.S. at 487-88.
27. Id. at 488.
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ers to disclose all of their associations regardless of whether the
associations are social, professional, political, avocational, or reli-
gious. Many of the relationships the statute required teachers to
reveal were, simply, irrelevant to occupational competence.28
United States v. Robel,29 decided seven years later, was perhaps
the most extreme application of the overbreadth doctrine. Peti-
tioner had been excluded from work in a defense facility under a
federal statute which made it a crime for any member of a "Com-
munist-action" organization to hold such employment. The Court
declared the statute to be overbroad in that it banned employ-
ment for some associations, such as passive membership or mem-
bership by persons in unsensitive military positions, which in all
likelihood were not incompatible with defense employment."
Clearly the Court's use in Shelton and Robel of an overbreadth
approach rather than the more conventional.practice of balancing
individual and state interests was decisive. The contrast between
the two approaches is captured in Justice Frankfurter's Shelton dis-
sent. Frankfurter wrote that the consideration of whether less re-
strictive means exist of serving a state interest is "constitutionally
relevant" but that it should not be dispositive.31 According to
Frankfurter, the issue should not be whether less restrictive means
are possible, but rather whether the means in fact chosen are rea-
sonable. The state, Frankfurter felt, should not be restricted to the
narrowest means of pursuing its interests. It may have been possi-
ble for Arkansas to assess Shelton's professional competence in a
manner less intrusive upon his associational interests than requir-
ing him to disclose all his affiliations, but, in Frankfurter's view, it
would be unreasonable to force Arkansas to limit the inquiry.3 2
28. Id. at 487-88.
29. 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
30. Id. at 265-66. Professor Gunther apparently agrees that Robel brought over-
breadth farther than it ever had been in the past. Gunther, Reflections on Robel: It's Not
What the Court Did But the Way that It Did It, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1140 (1968).
31. 364 U.S. at 493.
32. See id. at 494-95.
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II. THE UNDERPINNINGS OF OVERBREADTH AND ITS
SIMILARITY TO THE VOID-FOR-VAGUENESS DOCTRINE
A. The Essentials of Overbreadth
Shelton and Robel illustrate the two interrelated principles cen-
tral to the overbreadth rationale. First, certain constitutional in-
terests-such as freedom of association-are so precious to a
democratic society that they must be afforded doctrinal "breath-
ing space."3 3 Second, the danger of overbroad laws is not merely
their unnecessary application to otherwise privileged activity but
also the "chilling effect" they have on the general population's
willingness to exercise constitutional rights.3 It is feared that
overbroad laws serve not only to penalize protected activity, but
also-by their mere existence-to prevent people from engaging
in the activity altogether. The threat of sanctions may deter the
exercise of protected conduct "almost as potently as the actual ap-
plication of the sanctions. '3 5
Objections to overbreadth analysis have been directed not so
much to the logic of the principles described above but rather to
the relaxation of the traditional standing requirements resulting
from them. Overbreadth analysis assumes that when people are
faced with overbroad laws they are more likely to refrain from
engaging in otherwise protected activity that is encompassed by
the law than they are to engage in the activity and challenge the
laws in court.36 Advocates of overbreadth adjudication thus argue:
- overbroad laws are so dangerous to democracy that some-
one must be afforded standing to challenge them (since the laws
may be "chilling" such "precious" first amendment activity);
- persons who wish to engage in activities which deserve first
amendment protection may never challenge the laws in court (be-
cause they are more likely to refrain from engaging in that activ-
ity altogether);
- therefore, anyone who in fact engages in activity encom-
33. The notion that first amendment freedoms need "breathing space" to survive
originated in NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963) (enjoining enforcement of a
Virginia statute prohibiting solicitation of legal business on ground that the statute violated
freedoms of association and expression).
34. See Harvard Note, supra note 1, at 853. See generally Note, The Chilling Effect in
Constitutional Law, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 808 (1969).
35. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
36. See Harvard Note, supra note 1, at 853-54.
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passed by such a law should be allowed to challenge it as over-
broad, regardless of whether his or her conduct could permissibly
be proscribed; that is, regardless of whether the activity falls
within the law's "permissible" or "impermissible" scope .
An overbreadth plaintiff, it follows, is permitted to challenge
a law "on its face" rather than "as applied" to his or her activity.
If an overbreadth plaintiff is a person whose conduct could permis-
sibly have been proscribed under a properly drafted law, the
plaintiff, arguably, is challenging the law vicariously-that is, on
behalf of persons whose activity should not have been proscribed,
persons whose activity was wrongly "chilled. ' 38 If the challenge is
successful, the law is invalidated in toto until the legislature
redrafts it with the requisite specificity.3 9 The challenger, more-
over, is exonerated.
The above principles are illustrated in the following diagram,
which represents the scope of an overbroad law:
-"Permissible Scope": encompasses activity, including instances of
speech and association, which (in a court's estimation) may be pro-
scribed. People who have engaged in activity in this area and seek
to challenge the law may be called "hard core" plaintiffs.
"Impermissible Scope": encompasses activity, particularly instances
of speech and association, which may not (in a court's estimation)
be proscribed, due to the rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
People who have engaged in activity in this area and seek to chal-
lenge the law may be called "fringe" plaintiffs.
37. See id. at 853-56.
38. The vicarious nature of overbreadth challenges has been recognized at least since
the Supreme Court's decision in Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (discussed supra
note 18). For a discussion of the "Thornhill Standing Doctrine," see Sedler, Standing to
Assert Jus Tertii in the Supreme Court, 71 YALE L.J. 599, 613-16 (1962).
39. See Harvard Note, supra note 1, at 845, 852. As Professor Monaghan points out,
an alternative, less drastic version of overbreadth might be fashioned: a law should be de-
clared invalid if the court cannot place an unambiguous, narrow construction upon its
terms, spelling out clearly what activity it forbids. Monaghan, supra note 1, at 17-18.
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B. The Relationship Between Overbreadth Analysis and the
Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine
A concern for the existence of poorly drafted laws and a will-
ingness to relax constitutional standing requirements characterize
not only the overbreadth doctrine but also its counterpart: the
void-for-vagueness doctrine. That doctrine mandates that criminal
statutes and laws affecting constitutionally privileged activity be
drafted with sufficient clarity that people can readily conform
their conduct thereto without fear of idiosyncratic or discretionary en-
forcment.40 Vague laws, like overbroad laws, are said to have a chil-
ling effect on essential freedoms. Though the void-for-vagueness
doctrine is grounded in notions of due process and notice-and
therefore arguably should offer no relief for "hard core" appel-
lants who, presumably, knew their conduct could be pro-
scribed-courts have in fact allowed vicarious challenges to alleg-
edly vague laws. 41 Though a law may be considered overbroad but
not vague,42 and vice versa, the objectionable quality of both con-
40. The void-for-vagueness doctrine was surveyed in an influential article written by
Professor Amsterdam when he was a student. Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the
Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. (1960) [hereinafter Amsterdam].
41. See generally Amsterdam, supra note 40, at 96-104; Sedler, supra note 38, at 617-
20. See Monaghan, supra note 1, at 9. Professor Tribe has explained the principle underly-
ing a willingness to allow vicarious challenges: those whose expression is chilled by either
overbroad or unduly vague laws "cannot be expected to adjudicate their own rights, lack-
ing by definition the willingness to disobey the law." L. TRIBE, supra note 17, § 12-29, at
720.
Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976), illustrates the need for explicit judicial
articulation of the fact that those challenging governmental restrictions of first amendment
interests on the ground of vagueness rather than overbreadth are often afforded jus tertii.
In striking down a municipal ordinance which required that advance notice of any door-to-
door canvassing activities be given to the police department, the majority made clear that it
was relying on the vagueness, not the overbreadth, doctrine. Id. at 621 n.5. Dissenting
Justice Rehnquist remarked:
The Court seems initially to suggest .. that reliance on a "vagueness" theory
may somehow displace the normal prohibition against assertion of constitu-
tional jus tertii. Any logic in such a purported distinction escapes me. Broadrick
recognized that it is only the application of the doctrine of "overbreadth" which
sometimes permits limited exceptions to traditional rules of standing .
Id. at 633.
42. Sponick v. Detroit Police Dep't, 49 Mich. App. 162, 211 N.W.2d 674 (1973) (dis-
cussed infra notes 144-50), is a pertinent example of a law adjudged to be overbroad but
not vague. Like Morrisette, the case involved an "anti-association" regulation, though the
Sponick regulation also pertained to associations with suspected criminals. The court, re-
jecting the vagueness challenge, commented that it was clear which associations were pro-
scribed under the regulation. Id. at 177, 211 N.W.2d at 680-81. However, the court ac-
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stitutional infirmities is the same: both make laws susceptible to
sweeping and improper applications to activity otherwise pro-
tected by the first amendment.43 As a consequence, people are left
to "guess just what the law really means to cover, and fear of a
wrong guess inevitably leads people to forego the very rights the
Constitution sought to protect above all others." 44
Given this doctrinal kinship, one might suspect that the stan-
dard of review for allegedly overbroad laws should be the same as
the standard enunciated by the Supreme Court to assess statutory
vagueness: whether the law "either forbids or requires the doing
of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess as to its meaning and differ as to its applica-
tion."'45 Whereas with a vague law the uncertainty arises from the
words themselves, with an overbroad law the uncertainty stems
from two interrelated factors: an inability to discern the law's per-
missible scope as well as an inability to predict whether the law in
fact will be invoked against contemplated activity.46 Nevertheless,
cepted the overbreadth argument, writing at length as to such a regulation's potential for
impermissible application. Id. at 178-82, 211 N.W.2d at 681-83.
43. This affinity between vagueness and overbreadth has been widely recognized by
both the courts and the commentators. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589,
609 (1967); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432-33 (1963); Barenblatt v. United States,
360 U.S. 109, 137 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting); Harvard Note, supra note 1, at 845 n.5,
871-75; Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 YALE LJ. 464, 464 n.3 (1969);
Amsterdam, supra note 40, at 75-76, 80-81, 96-104. Interestingly, none of these cases and
articles explicitly proposes that the standard of review for vagueness and overbreadth
should generally be the same. Nevertheless, some commentators accuse courts of "simply
exchang[ing] overbreadth for vagueness." Monaghan, supra note 1, at 17 (quoting L.
TRIBE, supra note 17, at 716). See also P. FREUND, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES 67-68 (1961) (overbreadth is "really a special case of the problem of vagueness");
W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR, J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 816-18 (4th ed. 1975).
44. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 137-38 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting).
This argument was echoed in Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967): "Where
statutes have an overbroad sweep, just as where they are too vague, . . . those covered by
the statute are bound to limit their behavior to that which is unquestionably safe." Id. at
609.
45. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
46. Harvard Note, supra note 1, at 871-74. While commentators have emphasized the
former type of uncertainty (i.e., as to permissible scope), the latter type (i.e., as to whether
an overbroad law will in fact be invoked) is obviously an epiphenomenon of the former.
Justice Marshall has sympathetically portrayed the predicament of a person subject to a
law of uncertain scope, analogizing it to a Sword of Damocles:
That this Court will ultimately vindicate an employee if his speech is constitu-
tionally protected is of little consequence-for the value of a sword of Damo-
cles is that it hangs-not that it drops. For every employee who risks his job by
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a "vagueness-style" standard has not guided overbreadth adjudi-
cation. Rather, courts generally have followed the Supreme
Court's lead and assessed overbreadth either by examining
whether narrower drafting is possible (the approach of old-style
overbreadth) or by deciding whether narrower drafting is necessary
given the extent of the law's permissible scope (the recent
approach).'7
III. THE ASSAULT ON OVERBREADTH
A. Doctrinal Dissatisfaction
Judicial willingness to strike down laws in their entirety on
the basis of mere speculation as to possible impermissible applica-
tions has always been criticized by traditional legal thinkers. Judi-
cial review, they believe, must not be a hypothetical enterprise but
should take place only when courts are confronted with factual
situations in which laws clearly have evidenced their potential for
injustice. 8 It follows that only fringe plaintiffs (for whom the stat-
ute apparently has worked an injustice) should be able to chal-
lenge statutory overbreadth or vagueness.
Although the new Burger Court justices quickly evinced their
agreement with the traditional criticisms of overbreadth analy-
sis,49 it was, suprisingly, Justice Black-one of the original critics
of statutory overbreadth 5 0 - whose distaste for "vicarious adjudi-
cation" would prove most influential in sowing the seeds of re-
form for the overbreadth doctrine. In one of his last opinions,
Black charged that the basic function of federal courts as contem-
testing the limits of the statute, many more will choose the cautious path and
not speak at all.
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 231 (1974) (dissenting opinion).
47. See discussion of Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973), infra notes 52-74
and accompanying text.
48. See, e.g., A. BicKEL, THE LEms-r DANGERoUs BRANcH 115-16, 149-50 (1962); A. Cox,
THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 45 (1976) (suggesting that the
deterrence rationale of the overbreadth standing doctrine rests on pretense). See also G.
GUNTHER, supra note 22, at 1189-95.
49. Justices Powell and Rehnquist, who were in the majority in Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973) (discussed infra notes 52-74 and accompanying text),
joined the Court just after the other justices had called for a "re-examination" of the over-
breadth doctrine. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text for a discussion of the call for
a reexamination.
50. See supra note 25.
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plated by the Constitution is to resolve concrete disputes and not
to act as roving commissions which "survey the statute books and
pass judgment on laws before the courts are called upon to en-
force them."'"
B. The Broadrick Revision
In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,52 these criticisms resulted in an ef-
fective redrafting of the entire overbreadth doctrine-not merely
the rules of standing but also the accompanying standard of re-
view. Appellants were state employees who, after soliciting contri-
butions and distributing posters for the election campaign of one
of their superiors, were charged with violating state statutory
prohibitions of certain partisan political activities by classified civil
servants.5 3 They challenged the statutory provisions as overbroad,
pointing out that the prohibition encompassed such innocuous po-
litical activities as wearing buttons or displaying bumper stickers.5
The Court, however, responded that the potential for such imper-
missible applications did not, alone, oblige the Court to strike
down the statute on its face. Justice White, writing for the major-
ity, noted that the appellants' actual conduct could constitutionally
have been proscribed, and commented that the general reluctance
51. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 52 (1971) (denying injunctive relief to three
members of Progressive Labor Party who claimed that prosecution of a fourth member
under a syndicalism statute would inhibit their first amendment activity).
52. 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
53. The relevant statutory provisions are the sixth and seventh unnumbered
paragraphs of OxLA. STAT. tit. 74, § 818 (1971):
No employee in the classified service, and no member of the Personnel
Board shall, directly or indirectly, solicit, receive, or in any manner be con-
cerned in soliciting or receiving any assessment, subscription or contribution
for any political organization, candidacy or other political purpose; and no state
officer or state employee in the unclassified service shall solicit or receive any
such assessment, subscription or contribution from an employee in the classified
service.
No employee in the classified service shall be a member of any national,
state or local committee of a political party, or an officer or member of a com-
mittee of a partisan political club, or a candidate for nomination or election to
any paid public office, or shall take part in the management of affairs of any
political party or in any political campaign, except to exercise his right as a
citizen privately to express his opinion and to cast his vote.
The appellants also challenged the provisions as overly vague, 413 U. S. at 607-10, and
as violative of equal protection. Id. at 607 n.5. Both challenges were unsuccessful.
54. Id. at 609-10.
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of courts to allow vicarious defenses of constitutional rights stems
from deeply embedded principles of adjudication.5 5 The implica-
tions of overbreadth analysis for standing requirements are excep-
tional, explained White, and are limited to the area of first
amendment rights.56 White felt that given the remedy for over-
breadth-complete invalidation of the offending law-applying
the doctrine is "strong medicine" which should be used only as a
last resort when a limiting construction cannot be placed on the
challenged law. 57
White discerned from the Court's decisions a resolution that
the limited function of facial overbreadth adjudication dissipates
as the focus of the law moves from "pure speech" to "conduct." 58
He conceded that such laws, if drafted too broadly, might deter
protected activity. Nevertheless, he concluded that "there comes a
point where that effect-at best a prediction-cannot, with confi-
dence, justify invalidating a statute on its face and so prohibiting a
State from enforcing the statute against conduct that is admittedly
within its power to proscribe." 59 To the extent that a law pros-
cribes first amendment conduct, he declared, it will only be invali-
dated upon a showing of substantial overbreadth: 60 its constitu-
tional infirmity must present a "substantial" concern in the
context of the statute as a whole, substantiality being judged in
relation to the law's legitimate sweep." White declared that the
seeming infirmities of laws which are not substantially overbroad
must be cured not through invalidation of the laws but rather
"through case-by-case analysis of the fact situations to which [the
laws'] sanctions, assertedly, may not be applied." 2
The speculative overinclusiveness of the Oklahoma prohibi-
55. Id. at 610.
56. See id. at 612. But see Sedler, supra note 38; Amsterdam, supra note 40; Monaghan,
supra note 1; L. TRIBE, supra note 17, for the proposition that the standing requirements.
with regard to vagueness challenges also have been, in fact, relaxed.
57. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613.
58. Id. at 615.
59. Id.
60. Id. One could argue that the Broadrick speech-conduct distinction regards not the
focus of the law but rather the activity which is chilled. The commentators, however,
would disagree with this interpretation. L. TRIBE, supra note 17, § 12-24, at 711; id. § 12-
25, at 713; N.Y.U. Note, supra note 1, at 538-43.
61. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615, 616 n.14. Tribe characterizes this assessment as a test
of "comparative substantiality." L. TRIBE, supra note 17, § 12-25, at 713.
62. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615-16.
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tion on civil-servant political activity, White asserted, did not ne-
cessitate invalidation of the statutory subsections in which it was
embodied. More importantly, since the statute was not (in the ma-
jority's view) "substantially" overbroad, White concluded that
these appellants (whose conduct could permissibly have been pro-
scribed) did not have standing to attack it on behalf of third per-
sons. 3 Broadrick, in other words, instructs courts not to permit vi-
carious challenges to overbroad laws until they are persuaded that
the plaintiffs have made out a claim which, if true, would indicate
that the law is "substantially overbroad.""'
Initial attempts to explicate the Broadrick decision and assess
the impact it would have upon the adjudication of first amend-
ment claims echoed the concerns of Justice Brennan's dissent.
First, the majority offered no real foundation for its assertion that
the function of overbreadth scrutiny diminishes as the focus of
laws moves from "speech" to "conduct."6 Second, the "substanti-
ality" requirement was confusing because there always had been
an implicit requirement that a law be susceptible to more than a
few impermissible applications before a court would invalidate
it. 6 Thus, the number of impermissible applications an allegedly
overbroad statute might have had always been an important con-
sideration. Yet, as subsequent commentary67 and cases' have es-
tablished, the new substantiality requirement indeed is different
from the previous implicit understanding. By requiring that over-
breadth be of substantial concern before courts will invalidate laws
affecting first amendment activity, Broadrick transformed over-
breadth analysis from a quantitative to a balancing method of ad-
judication. Previously, a law would be declared overbroad and in-
63. Id. at 611-18. In other words, standing for "hard core" plaintiffs to challenge an
allegedly overbroad law is contingent upon the court's preliminary determination that if
the statute were overbroad as the plaintiff alleged, the overbreadth would be "substantial."
N.Y.U. Note, supra note 1, at 539.
64. See N.Y.U. Note, supra note 1, at 539, 542.
65. See Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 631 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also N.Y.U. Note, supra
note 1, at 544; Colorado Note, supra note 1, at 365.
66. See Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 630 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
67. See, e.g., N.Y.U. Note, supra note 1, at 544-45.
68. See, e.g.; Baron v. Meloni, 556 F. Supp. 796, 799 (W.D.N.Y. 1983) (discussed supra
note 17), and Vorbeck v. Schnicker, 660 F.2d 1260, 1262 (8th Cir. 1981) (both cases in-
volved assessments of police department regulations; in both it was noted that overbreadth
and vagueness are a matter of "degree and context"). See also United States v. Lambert,
446 F. Supp. 890, 898 (D. Conn. 1978).
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validated if a sufficient number of impermissible applications to
first amendment activity could be envisioned; after Broadrick, an
"overbroad" law would be invalidated only if the disparity between
its permissible and impermissible scopes is of sufficient concern to
warrant such "strong medicine." In the language of the Broadrick
majority, "particularly where conduct and not merely speech is in-
volved, we believe that the overbreadth must not only be real, but
substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate
sweep. "
6 9
From the outset it was clear that the impact of Broadrick
would be felt largely in the area of first amendment interests
other than "pure speech. ' 70 Nevertheless, assessments of the ex-
tent of this impact, as well as of the effect of the decision on "pure
speech," have been anything but uniform. Whereas one commen-
tator has asserted that the principles of traditional overbreadth
are, at least to an extent, "alive and relatively well,"' 71 another
seems to have concluded that the ultimate effect of Broadrick will
be to subsume overbreadth analysis under the conventional princi-
ples of constitutional adjudication which had been "more sub-
merged than abandoned during the flowering of the Warren
era."72 As the next sections will endeavor to show, both these as-
sessments are overly optimistic. In fact, the balancing require-
ments introduced by Broadrick-that overbreadth be assessed in
the light of the law's permissible scope, and that the disparity be-
tween a law's permissible and impermissible scopes be greater as
the focus of the law moves from pure speech to conduct-have
rendered overbreadth adjudication not merely weaker, but en-
tirely ineffective for the vindication of first amendment interests
other than "pure speech." Consequently, courts wishing to pro-
tect first amendment conduct are apt to recharacterize it as
"speech" ' or to ignore the Broadrick analysis altogether. 74
69. 413 U.S. at 615 (emphasis added).
70. See, e.g., N.Y.U. Note, at 544.
71. Shaman, supra note 1, at 281. Professor Shaman admitted, however, that the doc-
trine had been "wounded" by the Burger Court.
72. Torke, supra note 1, at 293. "The key to discovering the paths by which the Court
is 'retreating' from its overbreadth holiday of the sixties lies in the recognition that the
central dynamic of overbreadth is the peril posed by standardless administration rather
than the threat of a chilling effect on first amendment rights." Id. at 309. Professor Torke
feels that Broadrick "should [have] come as little surprise." Id. at 310.
73. This is especially true in New York, where the state's highest court has com-
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IV. THE AFTERMATH OF Broadrick
A. As Reflected in the Cases
The ambiguity of the Broadrick decision is best reflected in
the confusion of courts which attempted to apply its analysis.
Broadrick itself was not definitive of the new role of overbreadth
analysis;75 the decision merely established the parameters by
which a new model of overbreadth adjudication would be fash-
ioned. Unresolved were the following interrelated issues: How
substantial must the overbreadth of a law affecting "pure speech"
be before it is invalidated? How much more overbreadth must
courts condone with regard to laws addressed to first amendment
"conduct" or activity at some intermediate point along the
speech-conduct continuum? Where does "association" fall along
the continuum? To the extent that the cases have resolved these
issues, the effect on first amendment "conduct" and "association"
has been devastating. In this Section, the effect of the "substantial
overbreadth" doctrine will be illustrated by surveying cases in
which it has been employed in the United States Supreme Court
and the New York Court of Appeals.
1. Supreme Court decisions. The first post-Broadrick attempts by
the Supreme Court to refine the role of overbreadth analysis
augured poorly for the first amendment. In Arnett v. Kennedy,"
the Court rejected a challenge to a provision of the Lloyd-La Fol-
mented that the applicability of the overbreadth doctrine after Broadrick "beyond the cate-
gory of statutes regulating 'spoken words' is doubtful. ... Schulman v. New York City
Health and Hosp. Corp., 38 N.Y.2d 234, 242, 342 N.E.2d 501, 505, 379 N.Y.S.2d 702,
707-08 (1975). See infra notes 124-40 and accompanying text.
74. See, e.g., People v. Uplinger, 58 N.Y.2d 936, 447 N.E.2d 62, 460 N.Y.S.2d 514
(1983) (discussed infra notes 132-36 and accompanying text); Curie v. Ward, 46 N.Y.2d
1049, 389 N.E.2d 1070, 416 N.Y.S.2d 549 (1979).
75. As Justice Brennan concluded:
At this stage, it is obviously difficult to estimate the probable impact of today's
decision. If the requirement of "substantial" overbreadth is construed to mean
only that facial review is inappropriate where the likelihood of an impermissible
application of the statute is too small to generate a "chilling effect" on pro-
tected speech or conduct, then the impact is likely to be small. On the other
hand, if today's decision necessitates the drawing of artificial distinctions be-
tween protected speech and protected conduct, and if the "chill" on protected
conduct is rarely, if ever, found sufficient to require the facial invalidation of an
overbroad statute, then the effect could be very grave indeed.
Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 632-33 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
76. 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
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lette Act which authorized the suspension of civil servants for
"such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service. '7 7 Appel-
lee was a federal employee who had publicly accused a superior of
attempting to bribe an affiliated organization, and who subse-
quently, after certain administrative procedures, was given notice
of dismissal. The district court granted injunctive and declaratory
relief, holding, inter alia, that the suspension provision was uncon-
stitutionally vague and overbroad.7' The Supreme Court re-
versed. In upholding the provision, the Court did not state that
the provision was not, literally, vague and overbroad. Rather, the
Court implied merely that the degrees of these alleged infirmities
were insufficient to invalidate the statute.7 9 The Court's blend of
vagueness and overbreadth rationale was curious. As to the
breadth of the provision, the Court apparently felt the intention of
Congress ("conferring job protection rights on federal employees
which they had not previously had"80) vitiated the harm of any
potential overextension; the Court therefore held that the statute
should be construed to "exclude[] constitutionally protected
speech."" l As to the clarity of the words of the provision, the
Court commented that though "cause" could encompass a num-
ber of impermissible applications, it also encompassed an "infinite
variety of factual situations in which public statements by Govern-
ment employees might reasonably justify dismissal .... ."' The
breadth of the provision's permissible scope somehow satisfied the
Court that the Act spelled out, "as explicitly as is required," the
types of employee conduct which would result in dismissal. 3 Jus-
tice Marshall, dissenting, charged that to accept the majority's ap-
proach to assessing statutory overextension would be "to elimi-
nate overbreadth from the First Amendment lexicon."84 Such an
approach, asserted Marshall, divorces overbreadth adjudication
from its integral principle: curing "the potential deterrent effect
on constitutionally protected speech" caused by a law which is ei-
77. 5 U.S.C. § 7501(a) (repealed 1978).
78. Kennedy v. Sanchez, 349 F. Supp. 863 (N.D. Il1. 1972).
79. See Arnett, 416 U.S. at 158-59.
80. Id. at 162.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 161.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 229.
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ther overbroad or vague on its face.8"
One commentator has characterized the Arnett decision as
"an aberration"86 and another has termed it the "paradigm ' 87 of
Burger Court overbreadth adjudication. Though the decision did
not cite Broadrick, it did clarify a matter glossed over by the ear-
lier decision: the new approach to overbreadth analysis would af-
fect not only "conduct" but also "speech." '88 Despite recurring ac-
knowledgments of the principle that laws having a potential
inhibitory effect on speech are entitled to additional scrutiny,"
85. Id.
86. Shaman, supra note 1, at 277-78.
87. Monaghan, supra note 1, at 18.
88. See, e.g., Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 620 (1976) (invalidating a mu-
nicipal ordinance which required that advance notice be given to the local police depart-
ment of canvassing activities: "'stricter standards of permissible statutory vagueness may
be applied to a statute having a potentially inhibitory effect on speech'," (quoting Smith v.
California, 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959))); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205,
216-17 (1975) (invalidating as overbroad an ordinance making it a public nuisance and a
punishable offense for a drive-in movie theatre to exhibit films containing nudity when the
screen is visible from public street or place); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 817 (1975)
(reversing rejection of appellant's argument that statute making it a misdemeanor to adver-
tise abortions was overbroad; "pure speech" rather than conduct was involved, and lower
court gave consideration to whether the alleged overbreadth was substantial). See also Gor-
mley v. Department of Adult Probation, 449 U.S. 1023 (1980), where Justice White, the
author of Broadrick, dissented from the denial of certiorari to review the validation of a
state law which made it a misdemeanor to make an harassing telephone call. "It is not
difficult to imagine various clearly protected telephone communications that would fall
within the ban of the Connecticut statute." Id. at 1024.
89. See, e.g., U.S. v. Grace, 103 S. Ct. 1702, 1706 (1983) (peaceful picketing and
leafletting is speech which should be afforded special constitutional protection, even if it
takes place on sidewalks surrounding (but not the steps of) the Supreme Court building);
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 462-63 n.20 (1978) (while speech, gener-
ally, is afforded additional protection by the overbreadth doctrine, commercial speech,
which is less likely to be deterred than noncommercial speech, does not deserve over-
breadth protection); Madison School Dist. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n,
429 U.S. 167, 175-76, 177 (1976) (order of commission that board of education must cease
and desist from allowing non-union members to appear and speak at board meetings on
matters subject to collective bargaining is impermissible prior restraint of future speech
and conduct); Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 59-60 (1976) (while there is
a constitutional imperative to maintain "a free and open marketplace for the interchange
of ideas," this does not require invalidation of Detroit anti-skid row ordinance); Hynes v,
Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 620 (1976) (municipal ordinance requiring that advance
notice be given to the police department is an impermissible regulation of speech, given
the vagueness of the ordinance's terms); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205,
216-17 (1975) (the supposed need for an ordinance making it an offense for operators of
drive-in movies with screens that are visible from public places to exhibit films containing
nudity is not sufficient to justify deterrence of first amendment interests); Bigelow v. Vir-
ginia, 421 U.S. 809, 817 (1975) (advertisements for abortions are "pure speech" warrant-
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several subsequent decisions have established that overbreadth
scrutiny with regard to speech is not nearly as intense as in the
pre-Broadrick era. Curiously, this has resulted not from a tendency
to characterize activity as "conduct" 90 but rather from the ability
of the Court in most cases to treat instances of speech as, essen-
tially, impure.91 Thus, the Court has refused, on numerous occa-
sions, to apply overbreadth analysis to "commercial speech"; 92 de-
clined to review the breadth of a state law which makes it a
misdemeanor to make an harassing telephone call;93 and refused
to invalidate a Detroit "Anti-Skid Row" ordinance which conced-
edly affected communication protected by the first amendment
(the exhibition of films), concluding that the effect of the ordi-
nance appeared to be insignificant. 94 The Court also has upheld a
military regulation which proscribed "conduct unbecoming an of-
ficer" but which was invoked against an army physician who had,
among other things, urged black enlistees not to fight in
Vietnam .95
In two pornography cases,9" the Court has invoked the
Broadrick "substantiality" language to rebuff overbreadth chal-
lenges although no effort was made to characterize the activity af-
fected by the law as "conduct." In one of these cases, the Court
explained that since the state courts apparently recognized the
limitations on the kinds of sexual conduct which may not be rep-
ing application of overbreadth analysis). See also Gormley v. Department of Adult Proba-
tion, 449 U.S. 1023, 1024 (1980) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (statute
making it a misdemeanor to telephone another person with the intent to harass, annoy, or
alarm another person may well be substantially overbroad because speech does not lose its
constitutional protection merely because it is "annoying").
90. Characterizing distasteful "speech" as conduct, however, seems to be the pre-
ferred approach of the New York Court of Appeals. See infra notes 124-28.
91. "Impure" is used here in contrast to the reference in Broadrick to "pure speech."
413 U.S. at 615. For examples of cases in which the Court seems to suggest that certain
types of speech are "impure," see the commercial speech cases cited infra note 92, and the
pornography cases discussed infra notes 96-102 and accompanying text.
92. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489 (1982); Central Hudson Gas
& Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 565 n.8 (1980); Ohralik v. Ohio State
Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977). Cf Bigelow v.
Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (abortion advertisement held to be protected speech since it
was not merely a commercial solicitation, but had a "public interest component").
93. Gormley v. Department of Adult Probation, 449 U.S. 1023 (1980) (discussed supra
note 88).
94. Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
95. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
96. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982); Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767 (1977).
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resented or depicted under the obscenity laws (that is, since the
state court apparently knew the law's permissible scope), the law
could not be declared unconstitutionally overbroad. 7 In the more
recent case, the Court reversed a decision by the New York Court
of Appeals which invalidated a New York statute 8 prohibiting the
promotion of child sexual performances through the distribution
of materials displaying such performances. 9 The New York Court
had invalidated the statute on the ground that it prohibited "pure
speech," thus suggesting that Broadrick was inapplicable. 100 The
Court rejected this reasoning and applied Broadrick, declaring that
this was "the paradigmatic case of a state statute whose legitimate
reach dwarfs its arguably impermissible applications.' 01 Case-by-
case analysis of the fact situations to which the statute's sanctions
should not be applied was, in the Court's opinion, all that was
needed to cure the "overbreadth" of the statute. 10 2
In those cases in which the Court has addressed the breadth
of laws affecting activity which seems to implicate the right of as-
sociation-whether or not the Court considered association to be
"conduct"' 3
-the Court has adjudged the overbreadth of the
laws to be insubstantial. 0 4 In one decision, the Court upheld
Texas statutory restrictions on the ability of judges and certain
state and county officeholders to serve in the state legislature. 0 1
The majority called the interference on public officers' constitu-
tional interests "de minimis." Declining to construe the statute as
it might be applied to persons not before the Court, the majority
remarked that "[t]he First Amendment will not suffer if the con-
stitutionality [of the statute] is litigated on a case-by-case basis."' 0 6
The dissent objected that the restriction on judges (which was not
limited to Texas judges and which did not give judges the option
of resigning and then running for a legislative position) had, in
97. Ward, 431 U.S. at 770-71 (1977).
98. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.15 (McKinney 1980).
99. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982), rev'g People v. Ferber, 52 N.Y.2d 674,
422 N.E.2d 523, 439 N.Y.S.2d 863 (1981).
100. Ferber, 52 N.Y.2d at 677, 422 N.E.2d at 524, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 864-65.
101. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 773.
102. Id.
103. Association cases, however, seem potentially quite susceptible to the "conduct"
appellation. See Colorado Note, supra note 1, at 371-74.
104. See infra notes 105-23 and accompanying text.
105. Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957 (1982).
106. Id. at 972'n.6.
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many of its applications, "absolutely no connection to Texas' in-
terest in how Texas public officials perform their current du-
ties. 1 7 The dissent also felt that the majority's unwillingness to
assess the statute on the basis of hypothetical applications was im-
proper because, in the dissent's opinion, the overbreadth of the
statute was clearly substantial-particularly when compared with
"its relatively tenuous 'legitimate sweep.' "108
Similarly, the Court has upheld provisions of the Federal
Election Campaign Act which prohibited corporations and labor
unions from making contributions or expenditures in connection
with federal elections.10 9 The Court was satisfied that the associa-
tional interests affected by the restrictions were outweighed by the
interest in limiting corporate involvement in electoral politics. 10
In Buckley v. Valeo,"' the Court shed some light on the status
of freedom of association in the post-Broadrick first amendment hi-
erarchy. The case also involved a challenge to provisions of the
Federal Election Campaign Act. The provisions at issue limited
political contributions to candidates for federal elective office,"a2
placed ceilings on the amount of expenditures which could be
made on behalf of such candidates, 13 and required political com-
mittees to keep detailed records of contributions and expendi-
tures-including the names and addresses of persons who contrib-
ute more than certain fixed amounts." The Circuit Court of
Appeals had upheld both the contribution and expenditure provi-
sions on the ground that the nonspeech elements of first amend-
ment activity were overborne by the pressing governmental need
to assure public confidence in the integrity of the political pro-
cess." In rejecting this approach, the Court made clear that the
contribution and expenditure limitations operated in "an area of
the most fundamental First Amendment activities"-political ex-
107. Id. at 988 (emphasis original).
108. Id. at 989 n.10 (quoting Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615).
109. Federal Election Comm'n v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197
(1982) (upholding 2 U.S.C. § 44ib(a) (1977), which prohibits corporations and labor un-
ions from making contributions or expenditures in connection with federal elections).
110. Federal Election Comm'n, 459 U.S. at 207-08.
111. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
112. 18 U.S.C. § 608(b)(1)-(3) (repealed 1976).
113. Id. at § 608(a), (c), (e)(1) (declared unconstitutional by the Court).
114. 2 U.S.C. § 431 etseq., amended by Pub. L. 96-187, Title I, § 101, 93 Stat. 1339
(1980).
115. Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 840 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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pression and debate-which, as the Court had established, is
"closely allied"" 6 to association with others for the common ad-
vancement of political beliefs and ideas. The Court felt that the
limitations on speech and association imposed by the act simply
were not comparable to the restrictions imposed on activity which
the Court had in the past characterized as conduct. 1" The infer-
ence to be drawn from this distinction can only be that association
itself should not be characterized as conduct.
No matter how close the alliance between speech and associa-
tion, the Court clearly has considered association to be an inferior
ally. This constitutional hegemony is evident in Buckley. In a sepa-
rate discussion the Court acknowledged its earlier dicta that free-
dom of association is "a basic constitutional freedom" 118 which
"lies at the foundation of a free society"11 9 and may only be in-
fringed by laws which satisfy the "closest scrutiny. ' 12' The Court
nevertheless agreed that the appellee's primary justification for
the contribution limitations-"limit[ing] the actuality and appear-
ance of corruption resulting from large individual financial contri-
butions"-was sufficient to justify the abridgement of associa-
tional freedoms. 121 Similarly, the Court upheld the disclosure
provisions on the ground that the infringements on associational
activity served vital informational interests.1 22 In contrast, the
Court invalidated the expenditure provisions after noting that
they imposed "direct and substantial restrictions" on "protected
political expression. "123
2. New York decisions. Shortly after Broadrick was decided, the
New York Court of Appeals surmised that the continued applica-
bility of the overbreadth doctrine "beyond the category of stat-
utes regulating 'spoken words' is doubtful . . 124 Over the past
116. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25 (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 486 (1960)).
117. Id. at 16.
118. Id. at 25 (citing Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 57 (1973)).
119. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25 (citing Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 486 (1960); Bates
v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 522-23 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449,
460-61 (1958); and NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 452 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
120. 424 U.S. at 25 (citing NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. at 460-61).
121. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-29.
122. Id. at 60-84. The disclosure provisions were justified also as serving record-keep-
ing and corruption-curbing interests. Id. at 67-68.
123. Id. at 58-59.
124. Schulman v. New York City Health & Hosp. Corp., 38 N.Y.2d 234, 242, 342
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ten years, the court consistently has reaffirmed its contention that
the Broadrick opinion warrants such a restrictive reading.12 5 Every
time the court has applied Broadrick in cases involving governmen-
tal infringements on activity it considered to be "conduct," the
governmental interest in the infringement has prevailed.126 In Peo-
ple v. Smith, 2 7 for instance, the court rejected vagueness and over-
breadth challenges to a statute prohibiting loitering for the pur-
pose of engaging in prostitution, reasoning that though speech is
involved in the solicitation of sexual activity, the terms of the stat-
ute were limited to a form of conduct which never had been
protected.128
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals has on a number of
occasions invalidated laws which, under its own approach, it could
arguably have characterized as regulating conduct. People v. Fer-
ber1 29 is an excellent example. In its original opinion, the court
invalidated a state penal code provision forbidding the promotion
of sexual performances by children.1"' The court acknowledged
the Broadrick "pure speech"/conduct dichotomy but asserted that
"the statute here is clearly aimed at books, films, and other tradi-
tional forms of expression." ' 1 So aimed, the statute was held
unconstitutional.
On at least two occasions, the New York Court of Appeals has
vindicated first amendment interests other than "pure speech" by
avoiding the overbreadth doctrine altogether. In State v.
N.E.2d 501, 505, 379 N.Y.S.2d 702, 707-08 (1975).
125. Literally, Broadrick neither confines overbreadth'analysis to "pure speech" nor
exempts "pure speech" from the "substantiality" requirement. The decision merely says
that, particularly where conduct and not merely speech is involved, the overbreadth must
not only be real, but substantial. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615.
126. In addition to Schulman and Morrisette, see People v. Smith, 44 N.Y.2d 613, 378
N.E.2d 1032, 407 N.Y.S.2d 462 (1978) (discussed infra notes 127-28). But see infra notes
132-38 and accompanying text (discussion of cases in which the Court of Appeals has
avoided the speech-conduct distinction and held in favor of activities which it arguably
could have characterized as "conduct").
127. 44 N.Y.2d 613, 378 N.E.2d 1032, 407 N.Y.S.2d 462 (1978).
128. Id. at 623, 378 N.E.2d at 1038, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 468.
129. 52 N.Y.2d 674, 422 N.E.2d 523, 439 N.Y.S.2d 863 (1981), rev'd, 458 U.S. 747
(1982). The Supreme Court reversal of this case is discussed supra notes 99-102 and accom-
panying text.
130. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.15 (McKinney 1980).
131. Ferber, 52 N.Y.2d at 677, 422 N.E.2d at 524, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 864-65 (citing N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 263.00(4) (McKinney 1980)).
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Uplinger,132 the court invalidated a statute which was similar to the
one upheld five years earlier in Smith. 3 The Uplinger provision
forbade loitering in a public place for the purpose of engaging in
or soliciting other persons to engage in deviant sexual behavior.,""
Explicitly disavowing overbreadth analysis, the majority justified
its result by commenting that "[i]nasmuch as conduct ultimately
contemplated by the loitering statute may not be deemed crimi-
nal, we perceive no basis upon which the State may continue to
punish loitering for that purpose."13 5 Dissenting Judge Jasen (the
author of Morrisette) confessed that he was at a loss as to how the
majority's approach could be characterized as anything but "the
application of the overbreadth doctrine."' ' Similarly, in Curle v.
Ward,237 the court enjoined the disciplining of a prison guard who
was alleged to be a Ku Klux Klan member. The court disposed
the case in a memorandum opinion by holding that the state had
not provided sufficient evidence that employee membership in the
Klan would be detrimental to the operation of the correctional
facility."8
Several liberal applications of the overbreadth opinions may
be located in the decisions of the lower courts in New York. 139
Nevertheless, the courts generally have not departed from the re-
strictive reading of Broadrick adopted by the state's highest
132. 58 N.Y.2d 936, 447 N.E.2d 62, 460 N.Y.S.2d 514 (1983), cert. withdrawn as im-
providently granted, 104 S. Ct. 2332 (1984).
133. See supra text accompanying notes 127-28.
134. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.35(3) (McKinney 1980).
135. Uplinger, 58 N.Y.2d at 938, 447 N.E.2d at 63, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 515.
136. Id. at 941, 447 N.E.2d at 64-67, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 517.
137. 46 N.Y.2d 1049, 389 N.E.2d 1070, 416 N.Y.S.2d 549 (1979).
138. Id. at 1051, 389 N.E.2d at 1071, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 550.
139. See, e.g., Calderon v. City of Buffalo, 61 A.D.2d 323, 402 N.Y.S.2d 685 (4th
Dep't 1978) (invalidating as overbroad a regulation which prohibited the distribution of
indecent publications to minors); Hunter v. New York, 58 A.D.2d 136, 396 N.Y.S.2d 186
(1st Dep't 1977) (invalidating a portion of the governor's order that certain city employees
disclose their financial affairs); People v. J.W. Prods., 98 Misc. 2d 67, 413 N.Y.S.2d 552
(Crim. Ct. 1979) (invalidating as overbroad a licensing statute for motion picture operators
which limited opportunities of persons with criminal convictions); People v. Duryea, 76
Misc. 2d 948, 351 N.Y.S.2d 978 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (invalidating as an unconstitutional abridg-
ment of free speech a statute of the election law which made it a misdemeanor not to print
the name and address of the true distributor of political circulars). See also Judge Lazer's
dissent to the invalidation of the prohibition of topless dancing without similarly invalidat-
ing prohibition of bottomless dancing in 92-07 Restaurant, Inc. v. Liquor Auth., 80
A.D.2d 603, 435 N.Y.S.2d 989 (2d Dep't 1981).
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court.1 4 0 In New York, an individual who seeks to vindicate consti-
tutional interests through the application of the overbreadth doc-
trine would be advised to characterize the interests as "pure
speech," lest the court require a heavy burden of demonstrating
that the overbreadth is "real and substantial."
B. "Substantial Overbreadth" and the "Anti-Association" Regulation
Morrisette v. Dilworth is particularly illustrative of the ramifica-
tions of the revised overbreadth approach because it is unique in
American jurisprudence. Courts in two other jurisdictions have
confronted challenges to police department anti-association regu-
lations similar to the one upheld in Morrisette; both, however, in-
validated the regulation. In both cases, the perceived potential for
misapplication was sufficient to persuade the court that the regula-
tion was invalid.
In DeGrazio v. Civil Service Commission,""1 decided nearly a dec-
ade before Broadrick, the Illinois Supreme Court reviewed the re-
moval of a Chicago police lieutenant for travelling to Europe with
an individual who had four disorderly conduct convictions-the
latest of which had occurred twenty-six years before the associa-
tion-and who, according to the police commissioner, was gener-
ally considered not to be a law-abiding citizen. The case was de-
cided in 1964, four years after the Supreme Court's Shelton
decision, a time when the principles of overbreadth adjudication
were gaining influence. The court agreed with Lieutenant
DeGrazio that the departmental prohibition on associations and
140. Compare the cases cited infra note 139 with Belle v. Town Bd., 61 A.D.2d 352,
402 N.Y.S.2d 677 (4th Dep't 1978) (reversing Special Term's voiding of amendment to
town's code of ethics which forbade certain town administrators from being political com-
mittee persons); Evans v. Carey, 53 A.D.2d 109, 385 N.Y.S.2d 965 (4th Dep't) (upholding
financial disclosure requirements for public workers over privacy and overbreadth chal-
lenges by medical doctors of the Department of Health), affd, 40 N.Y.2d 1008, 359
N.E.2d 983, 391 N.Y.S.2d 393 (1976); People v. Folk, 109 Misc. 2d 738, 440 N.Y.S.2d 984
(Sup. Ct. 1981) (rejecting an overbreadth challenge and attempt to claim the activity of the
person charged with attempting to use children in sexual performances as "speech"); In re
Matter of Jonathan E.G., 107 Misc. 2d 900, 436 N.Y.S.2d 546 (Fain. Ct. 1980) (rejecting a
facial challenge to a statutory provision that eliminated need to obtain the consent of the
parent to obtain custody of a child for adoption when the parent has, as in case of incarcer-
ated person, lost civil liberties); People v. Martin, 100 Misc. 2d 774, 420 N.Y.S.2d 318
(Crim. Ct. 1979) (rejecting an innovative overbreadth challenge to an obscenity statute
based on the statute's affirmative-defense provision).
141. 31 Ill. 2d 482, 202 N.E.2d 522 (1964).
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fraternizations "with persons known to have criminal records"
was "invalid. ' 142 Although the court explicitly addressed the
vagueness of the term "criminal records," it implicitly objected to
the overbreadth of the regulation resulting from such vagueness.
The court wrote that a rule which prohibits associations "with all
persons who had been arrested or indicted, regardless of whether
they were acquitted, and regardless of the time of the arrest or
conviction or the nature of the offense," is invalid as bearing no
proper relation to the end sought to be accomplished.1 43
In Sponick v. Detroit Police Department,144 a Michigan appellate
court reviewed the disciplining of three Detroit police sergeants
who had been charged, inter alia, with violating a departmental
regulation proscribing knowing and intentional associations with
convicted criminals and persons charged with or
suspected of crimes . 45 The appellants were observed frequenting
the bars of, and being friendly with, a surveillance subject who
was suspected of gambling activities and who had several felony
convictions. The case, decided in 1973, was one of the first deci-
sions, state or federal, to cite Broadrick, a fact which accounts for
the court's failure to recognize that the "substantial overbreadth"
test requires judicial balancing.
It is our conclusion that some of the associations proscribed by Detroit Po-
lice Manual, ch. 3, § 34(41) have no possible bearing on the integrity of a
police officer and that of his department and no possible bearing on the pub-
lic's confidence in the police. The regulation does not proscribe only associa-
tion with individuals recently convicted or currently suspected of some
crime. The regulation prohibits a police officer from associating with a
neighbor, fellow church members, etc., arrested once decades ago. The reg-
ulation also prohibits a police officer from befriending a recently convicted
individual and helping him become a productive citizen. Such associations
cannot possibly impugn a police officer's integrity. Since the regulation thus
142. Id. at 483, 485, 202 N.E.2d at 524, 525.
143. Id.
144. 49 Mich. App. 162, 211 N.W.2d 674 (1973).
145. Specifically, Detroit Police Manual, ch. 3, § 34(41) (reprinted at 49 Mich. App. at
173 n.1, 211 N.W.2d at 678-79 n.1) prohibits officers from "[k]nowingly and intentionally
associating with (unless in the course of their official duties): convicted criminals or persons
charged with crimes excluding traffic and municipal ordinance violations; or persons
known or suspected of criminal offenses of any type, including subversive activities which
tend to jeopardize the security of the government."
Appellants were also charged with conduct unbecoming an officer, submitting false
daily logs, and failing to report contact with convicted criminals. Sponick, 49 Mich. App. at
173-74, 211 N.W.2d at 678-79.
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unnecessarily restricts police officers' fundamental right to associate freely,
that regulation is constitutionally infirm.
1 4 1
The court readily concluded that the overbreadth it identified
was "substantial. ' 147 The regulation's infirmity, it explained, was
neither theoretical nor limited to "highly unusual and unlikely cir-
cumstances";1 48 the court estimated that the regulation required
Detroit police officers to refrain from associating with hundreds
of thousands of people, a multitude which in Michigan was grow-
ing at the rate of 0.6% of the population each year.1 49 The court
commented further that since this percentage is higher in minor-
ity and poverty neighborhoods, the regulation required many po-
lice officers effectively to abandon their neighborhoods and their
pasts.1 50
The New York courts which considered Officer Morrisette's
case were familiar with the DeGrazio and Sponick decisions. Re-
sponding to the concern of the Illinois and Michigan courts that
such anti-association regulations were not limited to recent convic-
tions,"5 the Appellate Division for the Second Department com-
mented that the court was "not in as good a position as the police
commissioner in determining, as a rule of general applicability,
when convictions become too stale to justify the fraternization
ban. ' 152 The opinion of the Court of Appeals did not mention the
decisions, though Morrisette's counsel had emphasized Sponick in
his brief. 5
A careful reading of the New York opinions reveals that the
refusal of the state courts to follow suit was not merely a matter of
jurisdictional differences but resulted as well from the flexibility
of the "substantial overbreadth" standard. Morrisette was not de-
cided by contrasting the effect of anti-association regulations on
police officers in Suffolk County and Chicago or Detroit. Even if
the gravity of the infringement on associational interests were the
146. Sponick, 49 Mich. App. at 179, 211 N.W.2d at 681-82.
147. Id. at 181, 211 N.W.2d at 682.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 180-82 nn.2-3, 211 N.W.2d at 682 nn.2-3.
150. Id. at 182 n.3, 211 N.W.2d at 683 n.3.
151. See DeGrazio, 31 Ill. 2d at 485, 202 N.E.2d at 525; Sponick, 49 Mich. App. at 179,
211 N.W.2d at 681-82.
152. 89 A.D.2d at 104, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 867.
153. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 11, Morrisette v. Dilworth, 59 N.Y.2d 449, 452
N.E.2d 1222, 465 N.Y.S.2d 894 (1983).
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same, the New York courts simply were not convinced that such
infringement was "substantial." Recognizing that Broadrick re-
quires judicial balancing, the New York courts readily discerned
governmental interests advanced by the regulation-the desirabil-
ity of preserving the special, professional relationship between po-
lice officers and convicted persons,15 4 and the necessity of insuring
a perception of integrity in law enforcementl 55 -and perempto-
rily concluded that the overbreadth of the Suffolk County Police
Department's regulation was insubstantial.
V. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO OVERBREADTH ANALYSIS
The portrayal of Morrisette as illustrative of the need for a re-
formulation of overbreadth analysis is, in a sense, misleading. Po-
lice officers always have encountered doctrinal obstacles to the
vindication of their constitutional interests.' " Their status as pub-
lic employees has been sufficient to deflate their constitutional
claims, since public employment traditionally has been viewed as a
"privilege" rather than a "right. '1 57 Moreover, the fact that they
have been perceived by the courts as being members of a
154. 89 A.D.2d at 103, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 866-67.
155. Morrisette, 59 N.Y.2d at 452, 452 N.E.2d at 1223, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 896.
156. While it is beyond the scope of this Comment to provide an overview of the
extent to which police officers have been handicapped by their status as public employees,
see infra note 157 and accompanying text, and by their characterization as members of a
"paramilitary organization," see infra note 158 and accompanying text, it should be noted
that at the end of the 1960's (which, perhaps coincidentally, was the heyday of overbreadth
analysis) it appeared that even the Supreme Court was prepared to emancipate police of-
ficers from "second-class citizen[ry]." See Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967).
157. See generally Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitu-
tional Law, 81 HARV. L. Ray. 1439 (1968). See also Note, The Policeman: Must He Be a Second-
Class Citizen with Regard to His First Amendment Rights?, 46 N.Y.U. L. REV. 536 (1971).
The central maxim of the "right-privilege" analysis is that, since government need not
bestow privileges such as public employment in the first place, it can condition them on any
sacrifices it desires, including the forfeiture of constitutional rights. See generally Van Al-
styne, supra. This reasoning has not gone unchallenged. For at least fifty years scholars
have criticized right-privilege analysis by arguing that adherence to it results in judicial
indifference to governmental actions which accomplish indirectly what government is for-
bidden to do directly. For instance, since the state may not forbid people to profess religious
beliefs which include a strict recognition of Saturday as the sabbath, the state should like-
wise not be permitted to force people to renounce this form of sabbatarianism by withhold-
ing the "privilege" of unemployment compensation until they do so. See Sherbert v. Ver-
ner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional Right, 35
COLUM. L. REV. 321 (1935); Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1595 (1960);
Note, Another Look at Unconstitutional Conditions, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 144 (1968),
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"paramilitary" society158 has made particularly onerous their bur-
den of establishing the constitutional impermissibility of any par-
ticular governmental restriction on their activity. Arguably, a de-
cision against the associational interests of a police officer is
among the last places one ordinarily would seek out evidence of
the inequity of a constitutional doctrine.
On the other hand, on an intuitive level, the fact that Morris-
ette involved an assertion by a police officer of what some might
characterize as a lesser constitutional right1 59 can serve to high-
light its utility as a springboard for constitutional speculation.1 6 0 A
decision which seems inequitable with regard to the general public
or public employees other than police officers may well have
seemed reasonable had the affected party been a police officer. It
follows that a decision against the interests of a police officer
which seems inequitable despite the officer's lesser constitutional
expectations may well be the ideal indicium of the need for doctri-
nal reform.
Whether or not Morrisette provides such an indicium, it clearly
can be of value in analyzing a proposal which recognizes the need
to make doctrinal accommodation for the context in which an al-
leged constitutional infringement occurs. In this Section, Morrisette
will be employed to illustrate the superiority of an approach to
overbreadth analysis which is founded upon an acknowledgement
both of the concerns which gave rise to the doctrine and of the
affinity between overbreadth adjudication and the void-for-vague-
ness doctrine.
Ideally, the "hard medicine" of striking down a legislative or
administrative enactment should be prescribed only in those situa-
tions in which to do so would be consistent with the overbreadth
158. See generally 16 E. MCQUILLAN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 45.06b,
45.16 (rev. 3d ed. 1979); Note, supra note 157.
159. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 17, § 12-23.
160. History as well as logic has made the police officer the symbol of the public em-
ployee's constitutional plight. In McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29
N.E. 517 (1892), an enormously influential opinion written by Oliver Wendell Holmes
when he sat on the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, a police officer's challenge to a
departmental rule prohibiting political canvassing was summarily rejected. "The petitioner
may have a constitutional right to talk politics," Holmes wrote, "but he has no constitu-
tional right to be a policeman." Id. at 220, 29 N.E. at 517. Subsequently, the "right to be a
policeman" became a metaphor for a right to public employment. See, e.g., Note, The First
Amendment and Public Employees-An Emerging Constitutional Right to Be a Policeman?, 37 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 409 (1968).
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doctrine's seminal purposes: defrosting "chilled" first amendment
activity and providing "breathing space" for such activity."' 1 Nev-
ertheless, over the past ten years Broadrick has been cited largely
to rubberstamp legislative and administrative infringements upon
constitutional interests.16 2 Overbreadth analysis has become in-
creasingly inefficacious in assuring that citizens are able to discern
the permissible scope of laws infringing upon precious first
amendment activities. Consequently, overbreadth adjudication
hardly addresses the issue of whether an individual subject to an
overbroad law will be able to predict whether that law will in fact
be invoked against contemplated activity, regardless of whether
the permissible scope of the law is clear. The following represents
an approach to overbreadth analysis which proceeds from the
principle that the infirmities of "overbreadth" and "vagueness"
are in many respects identical.163
Challenges to allegedly overbroad laws (whether or not
brought by "hard core" plaintiffs) should be successful only when
a court is satisfied that the existence of the law is likely to be chil-
ling the exercise of first amendment freedoms. There are two
ways in which this can be demonstrated. First, a plaintiff can artic-
ulate one probable situation in which the law, under pre-Broadrick
standards or precedent, can not justifiably be applied. This ap-
proach is particularly appropriate with regard to laws which are
regularly enforced. Second, a plaintiff can establish that an alleg-
edly overbroad law is, in effect, "vague"-that people subject to it
cannot reasonably be certain as to whether it will in fact be invoked
against first amendment activity in which they desire to engage. This ap-
proach is particularly appropriate with regard to "catch-all" provi-
sions such as the unqualified association prohibition construed in
Morrisette-that is, laws which are drafted quite broadly but are
seldom or irregularly enforced. Such laws are susceptible to the
same problems of discretionary enforcement which prompted the
void-for-vagueness doctrine. An overbreadth plaintiff's burden,
however, is to establish that the uncertainty results not from the
ambiguity of a law's terms but rather from the facts that (1) the
law literally can be applied to first amendment activity which gen-
161. See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 75-140 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
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erally is immune from the government's regulatory prerogative,
and (2) notwithstanding the existence or possibility of judicial pro-
nouncements that the law should not be applied to such activity,
the reasonable person is in no position to know whether the law
will in fact be invoked against a given instance of such activity. In
other words, the overbreadth challenger must show that "fear of
a wrong guess" as to whether an overbroad law will be invoked
against first amendment activity is leading people to confine their
activity to that which, unquestionably, is safe.
Morrisette v. Dilworth illustrates how this revised overbreadth
analysis would be more equitable in protecting first amendment
interests. Officer Morrisette learned from the internal affairs ser-
geant that his association with Jukebox Tony might constitute a
violation of the anti-association regulation."" He then spoke with
his friend and discovered that the conviction had taken place
nearly twenty years earlier and that the felon had subsequently
received a certificate of relief from disabilities with regard to it.165
Officer Morrisette concluded, apparently after considering that
the regulation was not enforced to the letter, that the friendship
did not come within the prohibition. 6 Under the proposed analy-
sis, the court would have to determine whether reasonable per-
sons-even reasonable police officers-would have been uncertain
(as Morrisette apparently was) as to whether the regulation could
justifiably have been invoked to prohibit the type of activity in
which Morrisette desired to engage. Moreover, even if the court
were to hold that the regulation was justifiably and unequivocally
applicable to Morrisette,16 7 the court then would have to deter-
mine the validity of the regulation as to the hypothetical individu-
als Morrisette vicariously represented: a police officer who desires
to associate with a church member or a neighbor who had been
convicted of a crime decades prior; an officer who desires to reha-
164. Morrisette, 89 A.D.2d 99, 100, 454 N.Y.S.2d 864, 865 (2d Dep't 1982).
165. Id.
166. See id. at 100-01, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 865 (Morrisette was surprised by the news that
Jukebox Tony was a felon; the felony had occurred nearly 20 years earlier, when Jukebox
Tony was 22 years old; Jukebox Tony had received a certificate of relief from disabilities,
which Morrisette erroneously believed annulled the conviction; the regulation was not en-
forced to the letter).
167. No position need be taken here as to whether Officer Morrisette was a "fringe"
or "hard core" plaintiff.
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bilitate a recently convicted person;""" an individual from a high-
crime urban area who wants to be a police officer but does not
want to, effectively, "abandon" his or her past."6 9 If these individ-
uals could not reasonably predict whether the activity in which
they desire to engage would be encompassed within the anti-asso-
ciation regulation, the court would have to invalidate the
regulation.
CONCLUSION
Assuredly a police commissioner is justified in considering as-
sociation with hardened criminals and professional gamblers to be
conduct so "unbecoming an officer" that it should be specifically
prohibited in departmental rules. Likewise, a court is more than
justified in articulating compelling state interests which are ad-
dressed by such departmental rules, even though the rules may
infringe, incidentally, upon first amendment rights. But one must
question the constitutional doctrine under which a court can re-
quire police officers to endure a regulation which, literally, forbids
them to associate with persons whom twenty years earlier had
been convicted of one disorderly conduct charge. Under the re-
vised approach to overbreadth analysis proposed in this Comment,
a court would assess the validity of such a regulation not by specu-
lating as to whether it addresses governmental concerns sufficient
to render its obvious overbreadth "insubstantial" but rather by
contemplating whether reasonable persons could-or should
-conform their conduct to it. Deference to administrative deci-
sionmaking (in the words of one holdover from the Warren
Court170 ) need not require judicial abdication of the duty to pro-
tect fundamental interests-even those of police officers.
WILLIAM J. MAFFUCCI
168. See Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 11-12, Morrisette v. Dilworth, 59 N.Y.2d
449, 452 N.E.2d 1222, 465 N.Y.S.2d 894 (1983).
169. See Sponick, 49 Mich. App. at 182 n.3, 211 N.W.2d at 683 n.3.
170. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 14 (1974) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
490 [Vol. 33
